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Religious Law and Religious Freedom in
Saudi Arabia and Israel: A Comparative
Study
By RiCHARD N. MERENBACH
Member of the Class of 1989
I. INTRODUCTION
Ancient religious law continues to influence the laws of many na-
tions, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia where the laws are often explic-
itly taken from religious legal systems.1 Israel and Saudi Arabia
continue to use ancient laws and precepts that are of dubious value in the
twentieth century.2 Aside from the purely personal issue of the religious
justification for the use of religious law, use of religious law creates many
problems for the governments of Saudi Arabia and Israel. Further, the
use of religious law infringes on the basic civil liberties of freedom "of"
and "from" religion: Are the people of Saudi Arabia and Israel being
denied the inalienable right of freedom from religion?3
As a result of Saudi Arabia and Israel's use of religious law, the two
states experience many of the same difficulties and some of the same ben-
efits. In both countries the decision to use traditional (religious) law has
resulted in the partial abdication of state authority to religious figures.4
At the same time, important religious leaders support the secular govern-
1. I. ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTaM 54 (1975) (a theoreti-
cal discussion of religious law in Israel); see S. ABRAMOV, PERPETUAL DILEMMA; JEWISH
RELIGION IN THE JEWISH STATE 125-402 (1976) (a historical discussion of religious law in
Israel); S. AMIN, MIDDLE EAST LEGAL SYSTEMS 305-27 (1985) (a discussion of the structure
of the Saudi system of law).
2. See S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1; S. AMIN, supra note 1, at 305-27; I. ENGLARD, SUpra
note 1.
3. Although freedom from religion in specific and the concept of natural rights in general
are not universally accepted, they are among the basic foundations of western civilization.
Further, it is recognized as one of the basic human rights in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. UNrVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. XVIII. For the pur-
poses of this Note, freedom from religion will be accepted as a right essential to individual
freedom. State establishment of religion deprives the individual of the right to make basic,
personal choices inherent to one's self-definition.
4. See S. AMIN, supra note 1, at 305-27; S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 174-203; I. EN-
GLARD, supra note 1, at 75, 123-24.
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ments because of the states' utilization of religious law.5 This support
appears to be necessary to keep both the house of Saud in control of its
country6 and to maintain national unity in Israel.7 Religious support has
allowed the Saudis and the secular, political parties of Israel to engage in
aggressive modernization plans and economic development. Ironically,
these same modernization plans have also been slowed and sometimes
jeopardized by religious conflict.8 Furthermore, the application of reli-
gious law has compromised the quality of the nation's democracy and
interfered with the rights of the non-religious. In neither country is there
a meaningful right to freedom from religion.
Although the two nations experience similar problems, their appli-
cation of religious law is very different. Under Saudi Islamic law the
state is completely subservient to the laws of Muhammad and God.9 In
Israel, however, the state is dominant and theoretically free to choose
which laws to obey and which to ignore.10
Israel experiences some religious problems that Saudi Arabia does
not. Israel's application of religious law is opposed by many Israelis who
do not share the religious beliefs endorsed by the state. 1 In fact, the
majority of Jews in Israel do not accept the Orthodox Jewish tenets insti-
tutionalized by the Knesset. 2 The Orthodox protest when even the influ-
ence of religious law is diminished. In the past, these parties have caused
the government to fall by withdrawing from the coalition.13 The ultra-
Orthodox have even turned to rioting and destroying property when the
State has not met the religious zealots' expectations. 4 Likewise, secular-
5. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 147-73; S. AMIN, supra note 1, at 305-27; I. ENOLAItD,
supra note 1, at 117-18; Comment, Islamic Law and Modern Government: Saudi Arabia Sup-
plements the Shari'a to Regulate Development, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 413, 413-14
(1979).
6. See Comment, supra note 5, at 422-23, 444; Note, The Impact of Islamic Revivalism
on Contract and Usury Law in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, 22 Tax. INT'L L.J. 351, 356-57
(1987). Saud is the royal family of Saudi Arabia. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying
text.
7. See I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 147; S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 125-402.
8. Cf S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 125-402; S. AMIN, sUpr7 note 1, at 305-27; I EN-
GLARD, supra note 1, at 136, 184.
9. S. AMIN, supra note 1, at 313.
10. See generally S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1; I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 43-44, 152-53.
11. See Englard, Law and Religion in Israel, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 185, 189-90 (1987).
12. See generally S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 192-203, 215-16. The Knesset is Israel's
Parliament.
13. See Note, Who is a Jew? A Determination of Ethnic Status for Purposes of the Israel
Population Registry Act: Shalit v. Minister of the Interior (Israel 1969), 10 CoLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 133, 140 (1971). See also S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 147-73.
14. See S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 214-17; Englard, supra note 11, at 198-99; see, e.g.,
In Israel's Bus Stop War, a Synagogue Burns Too, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1986, at A2, col. 3
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ists have vandalized sacred symbols. 5 Furthermore, there is a significant
minority of Arabs in Israel who object to both state dominance over Is-
lamic law and the prominence of Jewish Law. 6 Thus, because religious
law in Israel does not have universal support, there is little tolerance for
any anachronisms caused by the law. 17 Ironically in Saudi Arabia, where
religious law is dominant, religious freedom is a minor issue; while in
Israel, where the role of religious law is limited, freedom from religion is
a critical issue.
Despite the problems faced by these nations, there is little chance
that either will eliminate the use of religious law in the near future be-
cause religion and religious law serve as foci of national identity.18 In-
deed, it would be difficult to conceive of either state without its national
religious law since religious factions in both countries would create tre-
mendous instability if the influence of religious law were diminished.
Due to the political structure in each nation and the size of the religious
groups, this instability might result in the fall of each state. In Israel,
however, some changes in religious law are necessary to alleviate injus-
tices caused by its current policies. Eventually the issue of freedom from
religion in Israel must be squarely confronted by the Knesset. Israel's
large non-religious faction has a right to be free from a government es-
tablished religion.
This Note discusses how lacunae in Islamic law have allowed suffi-
cient flexibility to permit modernization in Saudi Arabia. Further, this
Note discusses both how the use of strict interpretations of religious law,
and the limited application of the law allows the Saudi Arabian Govern-
ment to expand the scope of its discretion. This Note also discusses the
continuing difficulties created by Israel's use of religious law. In particu-
lar this Note discusses how Israel's use of religious law has been a contin-
uing cause for dispute in Israel.
[hereinafter Bus Stop War]; Israeli Leaders Act on Bus-Stop Conflict, N.Y. Times, June 13,
1986, at A3, col. 4 [hereinafter Israeli Leaders Act].
15. See, eg., Bus Stop War, supra note 14; Israeli Leaders Act, supra note 14; Swastikas
Deface Israeli Synagogue: Religious Schools Also Raided as Fight Deepens Between Orthodox
and Secular, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1986 at A3, col. 1. [hereinafter Swastikas Deface
Synagogue].
16. See generally R. EISENMAN, ISLAMIC LAW IN MANDATE PALESTINE AND MODERN
ISRAEL: A STUDY OF THE SURVIVAL AND REPEAL OF OTTOMAN LEGISLATIVE REFORM
328-469 (1973) (Ottoman Law is based on Islamic Law so when Ottoman Law is deem-
phasized in Israel so is Islamic Law).
17. I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 46; Englard, supra note 11; see S. ABRAMOV, supra note
1.
18. See Elon, The Legal System of Jewish Law, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL 221, 241
(1985).
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II. ISLAMIC LAW IN SAUDI ARABIA: SOME
DEFINITIONS AND BASICS
A. Islam: An Introduction
The essence of Islamic religion and culture is fbund in the meaning
of the word itself: "Islam" means submission. Even the King of Saudi
Arabia must submit to the will of God. 19 For all Muslims God's will is
to be discovered by reference to His final revelation,2° the Qu'ran.21 The
state exists to serve God,22 and its sovereign is merely God's trustee or
vicegerent.23
The state and the individual submit to God's will by submitting to
Shari'a (Islamic Law).2 Shari'a is derived from several sources, includ-
ing the Qu'ran.25 God is seen as the sole law giver and Shari'a controls
and defines the behavior of the state and of the individual in Islam.26 In
fact, secular authorities may not contradict Shari'a; they may only "sup-
plement it."27 The monarch may not make "laws" because this power is
seen as reserved by God:28 "He unto whom belongeth the sovereignty of
the heavens and the earth he hath taken unto himself no son nor hath he
any father in the sovereignty."'29 Instead the king issues only decrees.
However, royal decrees serve as secular laws in all but name.30 Any de-
cree that contradicts Shari'a is rendered invalid 31 and the state that
19. See Bassiouni, Sources of Islamic Law, and the Protection of Human Rights in the
Islamic Criminal Justice System, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3, 6 (M, Bas-
siouni ed. 1982).
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id. The traditional transliteration of the Holy Book of Islam is "Koran" but this Is a
less accurate transliteration. "Qu'ran" now seems to be preferred by scholars.
22. Id. at 8.
23. 2 THE KORAN INTERPRETED 53, sura 24, verse 55 (A. Arberry trans. 1955) (The
Qu'ran is divided into "chapters" called sura and verses. In this Note sura will be cited with
roman numerals and verses with arabic numerals e.g., Qu'ran XXIV:55); see also Bassiouni,
supra note 19, at 10.
24. See Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 10-11. Shari'a is literally translated as the "right
path" or "the path to the Watering Place." Note, supra note 6, at 352; Note, Human Rights
Practices in the Arab States: The Modern Impact of Shari'a Values, 12 GA. J. INT'L & COM'.
L. 55, 56 (1982).
25. The sources used vary between the schools of Islam. See Blassiouni, supra note 19, at
8-10; Comment, supra note 5, at 416-17.
26. "Verily, His are the creation and the command." Qu'ran VII:54, supra note 23. See
Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 10-12.
27. See Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 10-12.
28. Note, supra note 6, at 356; see Comment, supra note 5, at 443.
29. Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 10 (quoting Qu'ran XXV:2). Qu'ran XXV:2, supra note
23, gives a less clear, but concurring translation.
30. See Note, supra note 6, at 356-57; Comment, supra note :5, at 416.
31. See Note, supra note 6, at 357; Comment, supra note 5, at 416-17.
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promulgates such a decree must be overthrown.32 Thus, Shari'a can be
analogized to a constitution: it defines the relation of a state to the indi-
vidual and the bounds beyond which the state's laws are invalid.
B. Source and Influence of Saudi Arabia's and Islamic Law
In Saudi Arabia, Shari'a together with tribal tradition form the only
constitution.33 The Saudi Government and its regulations clearly have
been subordinated to Shari'a ever since the first formal documents of the
state were promulgated.34 In Saudi Arabia, theoretically the Shari'a is
the only check on the power of the king."1 However, this is not an insig-
nificant check. If the king exceeds the bounds established by Shari'a, the
people have a duty to overthrow him. 36 The king's practical powers are
further limited by the Organic Instructions and the Qu'ran's endorse-
ment of consultation.37 Note however that since the king only supple-
ments Shari'a, his authority is greatest in areas where the religious law is
silent.
Sharh"a, as used in Saudi Arabia, is derived from several sources. 8
The Qu'ran originated in the seventh century C.E.3 9 and is the basic
source of all Islamic law.' Muslims believe that the Qu'ran is the exact
word of God as given to Muhammad.4 1 However, the Qu'ran is not a
32. See Comment, supra note 5, at 429; Cf al-Saleh, The Right of the Individual to Per-
sonal Security in Islam, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 19, at 55, 89-
90.
33. Note, supra note 24, at 72; Voll, Wahhabiyah, in 15 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELI-
GION 313, 314 (M. Eliade editor in chief 1987).
34. The Organic Instructions were promulgated by Abdul Aziz in 1926 when forming the
monarchy. See Comment, supra note 5, at 426-27. Aziz was the founder of the Saudi King-
dom. He gained control by conquering most of the territory that is now Saudi Arabia. Id.
35. See Comment, supra note 5, at 429.
36. Id.; See al-Saleh, supra note 32, at 89-90.
37. "[T]heir affair being counsel between them .... " Qu'ran XLII:35, supra note 23; see
also Comment, supra note 5, at 424-27 which translates this passage as "Their affairs [are to be
conducted] by mutual Consultation. . ... " Consultation implies that the ruler is not supposed
to rule without the advice of trusted captains.
38. See Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 8-10; Comment, supra note 5, at 416-17.
39. In this note Common Era (C.E.) shall be used instead of the Christian dating of Anno
Dominie.
40. Bassiouni, Introduction, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 19,
at aiii-xiv; al-Saleh, supra note 32, at 86-88; Comment, supra note 5, at 417. Muslims date all
occurrences from the Prophet's migration from Mecca to Medina in 622 C.E.. However, they
mark the years after this date as Anno Hegirae (A.H.). Muhammad, in 15 Tim ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF RELIGION, supra note 33, at 137. Qu'ran was received both before and after the migra-
tion. See id.
41. "By the Star when it plunges, your comrade [Muhammad] is not astray, neither errs,
nor speaks he out of caprice." Qu'ran LIII:I, supra note 23; see also Comment, supra note 5,
at 417 n.27 (citing this passage). Muhammad (c. 570-632) is the founder of Islam. Muslims
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formal legal system providing simple answers to legal problems. Rather,
it contains a diverse mixture of commandments, philosophy, and moral-
ity all of which can obscure legal questions.42 The Qu'ran itself is based
upon pre-Prophet Arab culture and tradition. Therefore, it is well
adapted for Saudi society's Arab culture.4"
After the Qu'ran, the second most important sources of Islamic law
are the traditions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad that are not the
word of God.' These are called the Sunna or "the trodden path."4  The
Sunna's authority is derived from the Qu'ran, which appoints the
Prophet as the supreme interpreter"6 and makes his interpretations bind-
ing.4 7 Thus, the Sunna is the second most important religious source to
all Muslims. 4" It explains and interprets the general provisions of the
Qu'ran.
Although the Qu'ran and the Sunna are by far the most important
religious sources, there are other sources of Shari'a that are accepted by
some Muslims."0 The different opinions about the relative importance of
these other sources of Shari'a divide the Muslims into various schools.5 1
Some Muslim schools consider the consensus of scholars (Ijima') and the
use of analogy to other rules (Qiyas) to be of great importance. Other
schools accept as binding only the Qu'ran and the Sunna.5 2 The schools
that accept analogy and consensus are the Shi'a branch.5 3 The schools
that do not accept analogy and consensus comprise the Sunni branch. In
usually call Muhammad either the Prophet (Nabi) or the Messenger (rasul) (of God]. His
vocation is recorded at Qu'ran LIII:1-18, LXXIV:I-7. Muhammad, supra note 40, at 137,
143.
42. Comment, supra note 5, at 418.
43. See Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 4. "The reader should be conscious of the fact that
Islamic thought and practice originally emanated from an Arab cultural context and though
Islam was absorbed by other cultures, the Arab influence remained." Id.
44. al-Saleh, supra note 32, at 87; Bassiouni, supra note 40, at xiii.
45. Comment, supra note 5, at 418.
46. "[A]nd We have sent down to thee the Remembrance that thou mayest make clear to
mankind what was sent down to them.. . ." Qu'ran XVI:44, supra note 23; see also Comment,
supra note 5, at 418 n.36 (citing the same passage).
47. "0 believers, obey God and His Messenger... ." Qu'ran VIII:20, supra note 23; "And
obey God and obey the Messenger, and beware ... ." Qu'ran V:92, supra note 23; "Whosoever
obeys the Messenger thereby obeys God ... ." Qu'ran IV:82, supra note 23; see also Comment,
supra note 5, at 419 (discussing these passages).
48. Bassiouni, supra note 40, at xiii; al-Saleh, supra note 32, at 87.
49. Comment, supra note 5, at 418; Bassiouni, supra note 40, at xiii.
50. See al-Saleh, supra note 32, at 86-88; Bassiouni, supra note 40, at xiii-xiv; Comment,
supra note 5, at 419; Note, supra note 6, at 353-54.
51. Note, supra note 6, at 354.
52. Id.
53. See id.
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Saudi Arabia the dominant school is the Hanbali school, one of the four
Sunni schools. 4 The Hanbali is the most rigid and conservative of the
Sunni schools, which as a whole are considered more conservative than
the Shi'a schools." In Hanbalism analogy is never considered binding5 6
and consensus is considered binding if it was a consensus "of the com-
panions of the Prophet."5" Further, the Hanbali are known for their
strict adherence to the Qu'ran.5 8
C. History of Shari'a in Saudi Arabia: The Hanbali School
Once a small school, the rise of the Hanbali school began with the
family association formed by Abdul al-Wahab, the leader of the disci-
pline, and Muhammad Ibn Saud, a ruler of a small town in the Arabian
Peninsula. 9 Under the agreement, Saud and his descendants were to
have political authority with the blessings of the al-Wahab. In turn, the
religious authority of the al-Wahab was to be imposed wherever the al-
Saud could spread their rule by conquest.' Thus the Wahhabi reform
movement spread throughout Arabia as the house of Saud expanded its
territory. The al-Saud's claim of a mandate to rule is still derived from
this agreement. 61 The balance of power between the Sauds and religious
leaders was altered when Abdul Aziz, a descendant of Ibn Saud, sup-
pressed Wahhabi extremists in 1929 and created the permanent domi-
nance of the al-Saud over the religious leadership.62
However, Hanbalism has remained the official school throughout
the history of Saudi Arabia and its interpretations of Shari'a have shaped
the legal system.63 In fact, in accordance with the Wahhabi-Hanbali be-
liefs, the state has officially recognized only six religious texts as the bases
of Saudi law.6r When these six commentaries are silent, the courts are
instructed to use their discretion provided the reasoning of other schools
is not overlooked. If the Qu'ran and the Sunna are silent on any issue,
the king is free to issue a decree on the subject which is binding on the
54. Id.
55. See id.; Comment, supra note 5, at 421-22.
56. Comment, supra note 5, at 421-22; see Note, supra note 6, at 354.
57. Comment, supra note 5, at 419.
58. Id. at 422.
59. Id. at 422-23.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 423-24.
62. Id. at 424-25. The Wahhabi extremists were members primarily of the Inkwan al
Muslimin or Muslim Brethren that formed the core of Abdul Aziz's army. Id. at 425.
63. See S. AmIN, supra note 1, at 312, 314-19.
64. Id. at 314.
65. Id.
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courts unless it contradicts the spirit of Shari'a.6 Under the king's dis-
cretion, specialized courts of limited jurisdiction have been established to
handle areas of law falling under the various royal decrees. Further, the
king can still grant clemency after a Shari'a court has rendered
judgment.67
D. Application of Shari'a in Saudi Arabia
The practical effect of the use of religious law in Saudi Arabia is
minimized in several ways.68 First, since the Qu'ran and the Sunna are
silent in many modem areas of law (e.g., corporation, tax, oil and gas,
and immigration), the king has used his discretion to promulgate broad
legal codes in these "open" areas.69 Justified with reference to the princi-
ples of Shari'a, these codes are not, however, closely tied to its princi-
ples.70 Second, in criminal law, where the Qu'ran is not silent, the
technical and restrictive interpretations of Shari'a expand thd areas that
fall under the discretion of the courts. Any act that does not meet the
restrictive requirements of the Qu'ran and the Sunna may still be pun-
ished in the court's discretion. 71 This discretion is recognized as neces-
sary for the modernization of Islam.72
I. ISLAMIC LAW IN SAUDI ARABIA
A. Court Structure
The paramount position of Shari'a in Saudi Arabia is apparent in all
areas of the Saudi legal system. In Saudi Arabia, the courts of general
jurisdiction are the Shari'a Courts.73 In addition, there are two types of
religious appeals.74 The first appeals court consists of a panel of appel-
late judges. The second level of appeals is to the Permanent Committee
of the Supreme Judicial Council. 7 These courts are clearly independent
66. See id. at 315.
67. Id. at 320.
68. See id. at 314-15.
69. Id. at 314.
70. Id. at 316-18. Since Qu'ran is considered all encompassing, it is necessary to justify
every law of the king's by reference to the principles of Shari'a. Tee id.
71. See Forte, Islamic Law and the Crime of Theft: An Introduction, 34 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 47, 65 (1985).
72. See Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 15-19.
73. S. AMIN, supra note 1, at 319-22.
74. Id at 320-21.
75. A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, SAUDI BUSINESS AND LABOR LAW; ITS INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION 223-24 (1982). There are also the final possibilities of appeal to the king or
of obtaining a pardon, but these cannot be used to subvert the application of any penalty
required by the Qu'ran or the Sunna. See Comment, supra note 5, at 429; AI-Mutrak, Sharla
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of the executive.76 Appointments to the Shari'a Courts are by royal de-
cree, but the decree merely confirms the decision of the Supreme Judicial
Council General Committee.77 Furthermore, appointment to appellate
courts, including those to the Supreme Judicial Council, is entirely from
within the Shari'a Court system. Promotion is determined by seniority.
The pool of applicants is composed of those who meet the minimum
standard for higher office.78 In addition, the General Committee con-
firms all appointments following a probationary period and has the
power to remove judges determined to be incompetent.79 Since only the
chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council is directly appointed by the
king,8" the Judicial Council is a self-perpetuating organization that guar-
antees the independence of the judiciary and the continuing purity of
Shari'a.1
An additional guarantee of the purity of Saudi Islam is the system of
specialized courts of limited jurisdiction. Established by state regula-
tions, these specialized courts are designed to be inferior to the Shari'a
Courts since secular law is inferior to Shari'a.2 For example, conflicts in
jurisdiction are resolved by the Conflicts of Jurisdiction Committee, that
has a majority of members from the Supreme Judicial Council, thus leav-
ing only a minority of the seats for members representing the secular
codes and courts.8 3
B. Criminal Law
1. Categories of Crime
As Shari'a influence in a particular area of the law increases, less is
left to the discretion of the king's decrees. In criminal law, the Shari'a
has left little to the discretion of modem rulers. However, by the strict
Penalties and Ways of Their Implementation in the Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia (Second- Fixed
Penalties "Hudoud" and Discretionary Penalties "Ta'zir"), in THE EFF ET OF ISLAMIC LEGIS-
LATION ON CRIME PREVENTION IN SAUDI ARABIA; PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM
HELD IN RIYADH, 16-21 SsAwAL 1396 A.H. [9-13 OCTOBER 1976] 404, 424-26 (1980). The
Supreme Judicial Council has ten members and one chairman. The council is divided into two
subcommittees having different appellate duties. A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 75, at
224.
76. See A. LERRICK & Q. MIAN, supra note 75, at 220-21.
77. Id at 220-25.
78. Id. at 220-21.
79. Id at 220-25. The General Committee is made up of the five permanent members of
the Supreme Judicial Council and five part-time members who are appellate court judges. Id.
80. See Comment, supra note 5, at 429.
81. See A. LERRICK & Q. MAN, supra note 75, at 218-26.
82. See A. LERRICK & Q. MLAN, supra note 75, at 222-26, 240-50.
83. Id. at 225-26.
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and literal interpretation of procedural and evidentiary requirements,
courts have managed to expand both their own and the king's discre-
tion. 4 In Shari'a all crimes are divided into three categories of punish-
ment, each mentioned in the Qu'ran.85
The most rigidly defined category is hudud (had singular). This cat-
agory consists of crimes and punishments specifically defined in the
Qu'ran and the Sunna.s6 This specificity puts the punishment beyond
the discretion of any man. 7 However, in order to be considered a had
crime, the act must meet both strict evidentiary requirements and all the
elements of the crime as defined."' Any act that fails to meet these crite-
ria may only be punished as a ta'azir (discretionary) crime.89
The final group, quesas (retaliation) crimes, are those crimes in
which religious law grants to the victim or his relatives the right to seek
either retaliation or blood money.9" Quesas is permitted in cases of mur-
der, allowing the victim's family to demand its right to personally exe-
cute the murderer.9 However, quesas, like hudud, is strictly limited in
Saudi Arabia. Once a Shari'a Court approves of a quesas penalty, it must
be approved by the Supreme Judicial Council and the king before it can
be administered. 92 In the case of murder, for example, the trial court, the
Judicial Council, and the king must all agree that the following condi-
tions are met:
1) The accused must be an adult;
2) The victim must have been a Muslim, Christian, Jew, or someone
who has entered the country pursuant to a treaty;
3) The victim must have been a male;
4) The victim's family cannot have forgiven the perpetrator;
5) There must be at least two male eye-witnesses, or one male and two
females, or the perpetrator must confess in open court three times;
6) The accused must have been sober when committing the crime; and
84. See Forte, supra note 71.
85. See Ibn Jubeir, Definition of Crime According to Islamic Law and Islamic Legislative
Sources, in THE EFFEcT OF ISLAMIc LEGISLATION ON CRIME PREVENTION IN SAUDI ARA-
BIA, supra note 75, at 39.
86. See Bassiouni, supra note 19, at 24.
87. Id.
88. See Forte, supra note 71, at 55, 65.
89. Id. at 65. That is, crimes punishable at the discretion of the ruler or the judge, Id. at
48.
90. See Ai-Hewash, Sharia Penalties and Ways of Their Implementation in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia (First: Retaliation Penalty "Kisas'" Blood Money "Diya", Expiation "Kaf-
fara"), in THE EFFECT OF ISLAMIC LEGISLATION ON CRIME PREVENTION IN SAUDI ARABIA,
supra note 75, at 348.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 376.
[Vol. 12
Religious Law in Saudi Arabia
7) The victim must have been pious. 93
If the evidence fails in any of these or other ways the victim's family can
still get blood money or compensation, but cannot demand the mur-
derer's life. If the crime does not meet the quesas standards, it can still
be punished at the judge's discretion as a ta'azir crime.94
Ta'azir is the catch-all category which includes all acts committed
against the interest of the community that are not hudud or quesas
crimes.95 These often include crimes that have not met the strict hudud
definitions.96 In these areas the king is free to fill in the lacunae of
Shari'a and give guidance to the judges, who, without legislation, must
fill in the gaps themselves.97 The penalties may be the same as the hudud
penalties, death or flagellation, but more modem penalties, such as im-
prisonment and fines, are also authorized. 98 Conviction of a ta'azir crime
requires at least two competent witnesses. Women count as only half a
witness. 99 However, unlike hudud crimes the judge may look at any mit-
igating factors in establishing the penalties."' Furthermore, the king can
even grant a pardon. 101
2. Evidence Standards
The accused has full procedural protection under Islamic law, par-
ticularly if accused of a had crime.102 For example, all confessions of
hudud crimes must be voluntary 10 3 and the defendant must confess more
than once. 4 In addition, in hudud prosecutions the judge must be con-
vinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 Further, in
order to testify as witnesses to a had crime, people must meet very spe-
93. Bassiouni, Quesas Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note
19, at 203, 208-09.
94. See A1-Hewash, supra note 90; Bassiouni, supra note 93, at 206, 208-09.
95. Benmelha, Talazir Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note
19, at 211-12.
96. Ia at 213-14. See Mansour, Hudud Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM, supra note 19, at 195, 198-99.
97. Kamel, The Principle of Legality and Its Application in Islamic Criminal Justice, in
THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 19, at 149, 167; Benmelha, supra note
95, at 220.
98. See Benmelha, supra note 95, at 215-18.
99. Id. at 221.
100. Id. at 222.
101. Id. at 223.
102. See Note, supra note 24.
103. al-Saleh, supra note 32, at 73. Indeed, there is little evidence of torture in Saudi Ara-
bia. Note, supra note 24, at 73.
104. Note, supra note 24, at 73.
105. Id.
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cific criteria: they must be definite and agree on details; be mature, pious,
"manly," impartial, and Islamic; possess reason, memory, and speech; 10 6
not be related to the accused, nor be the spouse of the accused; and have
no enmity between the witness and the accused.'0 7 In addition, the testi-
mony must not be based on hearsay. 08
Because so few cases will meet these strict hudud evidentiary rules,
most cases are only punished under ta'azir. The relative looseness of
ta'azir serves to catch those acts that avoid punishment under the strict
hudud rules. As the courts apply had evidentiary requirements more
strictly, more cases will fall under ta'azir. In ta'azir no particular stan-
dard of admissibility exists and the rules of evidence are at the discretion
of the judges and the king.' 09 Thus, the state is not handicapped by the
traditional rigidity of Shari'a and has established modem rules of evi-
dence, which will apply in most cases since most criminal acts fall under
the court's discretion.
3. Substantive Criminal Law
The exactness of the definitions of the individual hudud crimes
causes ta'azir to be further emphasized. For example, because the ele-
ments of a had crime are so precisely designed and rarely met, ta'azir
predominates. A good example of Shari'a's rigidity is the definition of
the had crime of theft. The property must be taken from either a private
house or from under guard, making the crime similar to the common law
crime of burglary or robbery. 110 If the house is left open or an object is
left unguarded, there can be no theft."' To be guilty of had theft the
thief must be a competent adult, must have the intent to commit the
crime, and not be under compulsion. 1 2 Additionally, the stolen item
must be above a minimum value, cannot be intellectual property (e.g.,
books, musical instruments, and items intended for amusement), and the
thief must lack any colorable claim to the property. 1 3 A final require-
ment is that the item must be taken by stealth. If the "chain of secrecy is
broken" at any time, then the requirement of stealth is not met. For
106. Samala, General Principles of Criminal Evidence in Islamic Jurisprudence, in Ttiv Is-
LAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 19, at 110, 116-18. As to the element of
speech, the Hanbali school does not allow sign language, although writing may be used. Id. at
116.
107. Id at 118.
108. Id. at 117.
109. al-Saleh, supra note 32, at 77.
110. Forte, supra note 71, at 62-64.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 55-57.
113. See id at 58-65.
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example, if the thief is an invited guest, the item is taken from a public
access building, or even if the thief is simply caught in possession of the
object, then the crime lacks the requisite stealth.'1 4 If any of these condi-
tions are not met, the crime may only be punished under ta'azir.11s
Under Islamic law poverty is usually an absolute defense to had
theft. In Saudi Arabia, poverty is not a defense because Saudi Arabia is
"blessed with [an] abundance of wealth and the opportunity of providing
work for everybody, so ascribing theft to poverty.., is unacceptable."' "16
Similar restrictions exist for other hudud crimes. For instance, the
crime of transgression against the religious authorities (revolution) is
only a had crime if the perpetrator is subdued or killed. A transgressor
who surrenders can only be punished by ta'azir.1"7 In the case of high-
way robbery, the crime must be committed in broad daylight, and some
scholars say, outside of a town or city." 8 To be guilty of the had crime
of adultery the accused must either confess in detail or be seen in the
actual act, by four witnesses. 19 Merely being naked is insufficient.' 20
Prosecution is further complicated because one who alleges adultery
must produce four witnesses to the adulterous act or he becomes guilty of
the had crime of defamation, punishable by eighty lashes.' 2 1
4. Conclusion
Saudi Arabian criminal law is kept modem by the very strictness of
Shari'a. Any crime that fails to meet the various strict rules is subject to
punishment only if it appeals to the modem minds of the king and his
judges. For example, in Saudi Arabia between 1957 and 1982 only six-
teen people were convicted of robbery."2 The severity of the punish-
ments is likewise not a problem in Saudi Arabia because the strict hudud
punishments are rarely applied and also because these punishments are
accepted as just. The penalties are accepted in part because, "[tihe hand
that steals is but an instrument of evil and crime, and if we do not ampu-
114. Id. at 64. It should be noted that although similar to the safekeeping requirement,
stealth is a conceptually different requirement. Id.; see also supra note 113 and accompanying
text.
115. See Forte, supra note 71, at 65.
116. A1-Mutrak, supra note 75, at 464, 467 (Comments of As-Saleh).
117. Mansour, supra note 96, at 197-98.
118. A1-Mutrak, supra note 75, at 454.
119. Mansour, supra note 96, at 199.
120. Id.
121. Mansour, supra note 96, at 199. "And those who launch against chaste women and
produce not four witnesses to support their allegations, flog them with 80 stripes .... " Saying
of the Prophet, quoted in id.
122. See Mansour, supra note 96, at 201.
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tate it the peace and security of society will be jeopardized, for the thief
may resort to murder in self-defense to avoid being caught."' 23 Indeed,
Islamic scholars appear very proud both of the strictness of the legal
system and of the infrequent use of punishments. ' '
C. Modernization of Civil Law within the Bounds of Shari'a
In order to preserve the unique Saudi legal structure, the Saudis are
attempting to modernize while at the same time avoiding Westerniza-
tion.125 Using its discretion to supplement Shari'a, the Kingdom has cre-
ated by royal decree special commercial courts, workers' courts, and
arbitration boards to provide a modem climate for foreign investors.1 26
Because each royal decree must be declared to be within the "spirit" of
Shari'a,127 specific reference is made to provisions of the Qu'ran and the
Sunna to support the new regulations. 128 Further, the regulations often
support Saudiization of capital and labor in order to protect the tradi-
tional Saudi way of life and Shari'a.'29
As part of this modernization process, foreign companies are en-
couraged to have a high percentage of Saudi ownership. Companies that
meet these ownership requirements receive significant tax and bidding
advantages. 130 To further protect the Kingdom from outside influences,
foreign workers cannot freely immigrate to Saudi Arabia unless an em-
ployer can prove that there is no Saudi available for the job.1 31 Large
numbers of foreign employers are also required to -train a minimum per-
centage of Saudis for technical positions. The goal behind this Saudi
training policy is eventually to end Saudi Arabian dependency on foreign
skilled workers, thus guaranteeing the purity of Shar'a.132 Despite tradi-
tional views on the role of women, the Saudis have tried expanding the
number of women in the work force. By boosting the number of Saudi
employees, it is hoped that foreign influence will be reduced. 133 This is a
surprising move considering the general subordination of women under
Islamic law. Finally, taxes on the salaries of foreign workers are forgiven
123. Al-Mutrak, supra note 75, at 452. See generally THE EFFEcr OF IsLAMIC LEOIsLA-
TION ON CRIME PREVENTION IN SAUDI ARABIA, supra note 75.
124. See Al-Mutrak, supra note 75, at 463-64.
125. See Comment, supra note 5.
126. Id. at 448-49.
127. See S. AMIN, supra note 1, at 316-18.
128. Id
129. Comment, supra note 5, at 451-53.
130. Id. at 472.
131. Id. at 474-75. Citizens of Yemen, however, may immigrate. Id. at 474.
132. See id. at 477-78.
133. Id. at 478-79.
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to encourage temporary immigration. 134
These regulations lead to greater inefficiency and make doing busi-
ness in Saudi Arabia more expensive. Still, Saudi Arabia's vast wealth
makes the efficiency and tax loss reasonable.1 35 Even with the currently
depressed oil profits, Saudi Arabia has not had to return to using taxes to
support its budget.136
The Saudi economy suffers a reduction in its potential GNP by lim-
iting the general work force to men, 137 which is in accordance with tradi-
tional Islamic gender roles. The cost to Saudi society is significant,
particularly when considered in light of the small size of the work
force.'13  The Saudis, however, can afford the resultant cost of importing
foreign workers and the loss in economic efficiency. 139 The Saudis are
willing and able to pay the costs of preserving Shari'a in its purest form,
and the Saudi women are willing to accept their traditional religious
positions. 40
D. Conclusions
The Saudi use of Shari'a produces few significant problems for Saudi
Arabia. Saudi Arabia can use Shari'a because it has the overwhelming
support of the Saudi people' 4 1 and because the Saudis can afford the eco-
nomic burden created by their devotion to tradition.142 The establish-
ment of a state religion does not violate individual liberty when all the
citizens believe in that religion. Although not clearly unanimous, the
support for Hanbali Islam in Saudi Arabia appears almost universal. In
addition, the problems one might expect when applying a thousand year
old legal system do not manifest themselves in the Kingdom because the
rigidity of enforcement procedures makes it applicable in only a few
cases.' 43 Furthermore, discretion can be and is used to modernize Saudi
134. Id. at 471.
135. Cf Roberts, Saudis' Financial Empire in Decline, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 27,
1988, § Briefing, at 1, col. 1 (discussing declining Saudi income and the Saudi decision to
borrow money in order to support Iraq and fuel there own economic development. Although
the Saudis are now borrowing money to balance their budget, they remain financially secure.).
136. Id. Taxes on expatriates are being considered. Id.
137. See Comment, supra note 5, at 473-74.
138. Id.
139. See Roberts, supra note 135.
140. See Comment, supra note 5.
141. See id. at 480-81.
142. Larsen, Saudi Rigors Tougher Task of Recruiters, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 15, 1980,
at 31, col. 3 (discussing the costs to American business when dealing with Saudi restrictions);
Roberts, supra note 135.
143. See supra notes 84-124 and accompanying text.
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law when necessary. 1 "4 Thus, because of the overwhelming belief that
Shari'a should be pre-eminent, any attempt to diminish its importance
would destabilize the country of Saudi Arabia.145
IV. RELIGIOUS LAW IN ISRAEL: SOME DEFINITIONS
A. Zionism, Secularism, and Orthodoxy
While in Saudi Arabia there is little dispute that Shari'a and Islam
are the dominant forces in the country, 146 no such agreement on the ba-
sic relationship of religious law to the authority of the state exists in
Israel.147 From Israel's conception, there has been no consensus as to
whether Israel was to be a secular state of Jews or a Jewish state that
conformed in all possible ways to Jewish law. 148 Initially, the Zionist
movement was distinctly secular1 49 and the early Jewish immigrants to
Palestine were often not religious.150 While the secular Zionist move-
ment was aiding immigration and immigrants, many Orthodox Jews
were actively involved in opposing Zionism. 15' This opposition was
based on the traditional belief that the Messiah would come and lead the
Jews back to the "Promised Land" and re-establish a Jewish state. 152
Many of the Orthodox believed that a premature return to Eratz Israel
by the Jews would postpone the return of the Messiah.15 3
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, Orthodox opposition to a Jewish
majority state in Palestine was reduced and the support of the major Or-
thodox Anti-Zionist organization was secured in return for promises that
certain Jewish laws would be kept intact.154 This -trade off was seen as
creating a permanent status quo defining which religious laws were to be
the laws of the State of Israel. Even today violations of the "status quo
agreement" result in violent reactions by the Ultra-Orthodox.1 55 In es-
sence, the agreement guaranteed that the laws of personal status (e.g.,
marriage, divorce, and adoption) and the recognition of the Sabbath as
144. See Comment, supra note 5; supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
145. See Comment, supra note 5, at 444, 480-81.
146. See supra notes 19-71 and accompanying text.
147. See I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 53-55; Englard, supra note 11, at 190; Elon, supra
note 18, at 240-41.
148. Plaut, Forward to S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 11-15.
149. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 322; Englard, supra note 11, at 204.
150. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 117; I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 53-54.
151. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 74-76.
152. Id. at 63, 75.
153. See id. at 75.
154. See id. at 125-28.
155. See Bus Stop War, supra note 14; Israeli Leaders Act, supra note 14.
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an official day of rest would be preserved."5 6 Although a political com-
promise was reached, some Orthodox continue to actively oppose the
State of Israel.'57 Furthermore, many secularists consider the Jewish reli-
gion to be a relic of European ghettos with no modem relevance.1"
Secularists continue to reject the application of Jewish law in the
Jewish State. The secularists seek freedom from religion and want Israel
to be a nationalistic homeland.s 9 Secularists consider religion to be an
important part of Jewish nationalism only in terms of a shared past
history.160
B. Religious Law in Israel
Although Israel was founded primarily as a secular state, Jewish law
(Halakha) is still used by the government. Jewish law, however, is or-
ganized more clearly and precisely than Islam's Shari'a. Halakha is
based on the Torah or the first five books of Ta Nakh,161 which contain
the laws allegedly given to Moses at Sinai.' 61 The Orthodox believe that
when Moses received the Torah he also received explanations and eluci-
dations from God on these laws.1 63 These details are called Oral To-
rah, 16 and were recorded in the second century C.E. in the Mishna.165
Both the discussion leading to the Mishna's selection, and commentary
on the Mishna constitute the Talmud.6 6 The Talmud is the final official
codification of Oral Torah (although, any commentary on Talmud is
considered part of Oral Torah.1 67) This is the entire mass of work that
the Knesset uses whenever it declares Jewish law to be the law of Israel.
The Ultra-Orthodox believe that the Talmud should be the law of Israel,
a notion rejected by secularists.1 68
In the area of personal status, where religious law is used almost
exclusively, the power of interpretation is given to religious courts.
169
156. Swastikas Deface Synagogue, supra note 15; see also Englard, supra note 11, at 192.
157. Englard, supra note 11, at 186-88.
158. See S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 323-26.
159. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 321-44
160. Englard, supra note 11, at 187; see I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 187.
161. The Ta Nakh is the Christian Old Testament.
162. H. DONiN, To BE A JEW: A GUIDE TO JEWISH OBSERVANCE IN CONTEMPORARY
LIFE 24, 25 (1972).
163. Id. at 24-25.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 26.
166. Id. at 25-26. There are two versions of Talmud, Babylonian and Palestinian (Jerusa-
lem), and they are only slightly different.
167. Id. at 27.
168. I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 188.
169. See S. ABRAMov, supra note 1, at 192-98. Personal status includes suits involving
19881
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The Orthodox are guaranteed dominance over the Jewish courts,"' thus
insuring that Halakha will be strictly enforced. The Supreme Court is
only permitted to review whether the religious courts have gone beyond
their jurisdiction. It is not permitted to examine the religious courts'
application of Halakha.71 In addition, to avoid completely losing au-
thority, the religious courts bend religious law in order to modernize and
forestall intrusion by secular legislation."2 Further, the Orthodox
Rabbis accept the Knesset's minor intrusion into the application of reli-
gious law in matters of personal status. For example, they accepted the
creation of appellate religious courts. 173
Secular Jews still demand the option to use non-religious courts and
law. Many non-religious Jews resent both the restriction on their lives by
the use of a religion to which they do not ascribe and the denial of a basic
civil right, freedom from religion. On the other hand, some non-Ortho-
dox reject civil marriage and divorce, believing it would irreversibly split
the community because the Orthodox would not consider the offspring of
some civil marriages to be eligible to marry other Jews.174
In addition to the split in the Jewish community itself over the use
of Halakha, Israel has a significant number of non-Jews, mainly Mus-
lims, who also resent the use of Halakha.17 In response to this treat-
ment, Israel has separate religious courts to handle questions of personal
status for the significant minority religions.1 76 Any curtailment of the
power of the minority religious courts is simultaneously resisted by these
courts and resented by Israeli-Arabs.177
V. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE USE OF RELIGIOUS
LAW IN ISRAEL
Like Saudi Arabia, 178 Israel has been unable to agree on a specific
marriage, divorce, alimony, maintenance, guardianship, legitimation, wills, legacies etc.
Adoption was also included until 1952 when it was deemed covered by secular laws. H.
BAKER, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 92-93 (1961).
170. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 179-80, 194-95.
171. See Elon, Development in the Rabbinic Judiciary of Israel, 5 DINE ISRAEL LXXI,
LXXVIII (1974).
172. Cf I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 208.
173. Elon, supra note 171, at LXXIII.
174. See I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 200.
175. See R. EISENMAN, supra note 16.
176. Id. The other recognized religions are Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Georgia
Armenian, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Chaldean Uniatc, Greek Catholic Melkite,
Maronite, and Syrian Orthodox. H. BAKER, supra note 169, at 93.
177. I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 189-90; see R. EISENMAN, supra note 16,
178. Comment, supra note 5, at 430-31.
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constitution. 9 This is one of the clearest manifestations of the conflict
concerning the nature of the State of Israel.' 0 Instead of a constitution,
Israel has a series of basic or fundamental laws, which, although
amended or repealed as easily as a standard law, are marked as especially
important.' A major dispute within Israel involves the importance that
should be accorded to Jewish law. Part of the nation believes that Israel
should be a religious state using traditional religious law, while many
others-believe that Israel should be a secular, national homeland.' 82 The
balance that has been struck, using religious law in limited areas, denies
secularists their right to be free from a state established religion."8 3 How-
ever, passage of a constitution resolving this issue would lead to a bitter
split of the nation reflecting the two divergent points of view.
This division is also found in the Knesset. Traditionally, Israel has
been ruled by a coalition government. Ordinarily, no party can obtain a
majority of Knesset seats. 8 This phenomenon enables the religious par-
ties to "sell" their support to a secular party in return for support on
issues of religious importance.'
A. Who Is a Jew?
Since Israelis are split on the use of secular or religious defini-
tions,' 7 it naturally follows that one of the most divisive issues is the
question of who is a Jew.18 The answer goes to the heart of the national-
ism issue.'8 9 Although this question might seem an unimportant theoret-
ical dispute, it has practical importance. 19 Both the Law of Return and
the Population Registry Act require this question to be answered.19'
179. S. ABRAMoV, supra note 1, at 135-46.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See i. at 380-402.
183. See supra note 3.
184. See id. at 135-46.
185. Id. at 147-54; Englard, supra note 11, at 191-92.
186. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 147-54; see also Englard, supra note 11, at 191-92.
187. S. ABRAMov, supra note 1, at 270-320; I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 59-60, Note,
supra note 13, at 138-39.
188. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 270-320; I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 59-60, Note,
supra note 13, at 140.
189. S. ABRAMov, supra note 1, at 270-320; see also I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 59-60,
Note, supra note 13, at 137.
190. Note, supra note 13, at 139.
191. The Law of Return gives Jews the right to citizenship upon arrival in Israel. Id. The
Law of Return is one of the Basic Laws of Israel that comprises part of its pseudo-Constitu-
tion. See H. BAKER, supra note 169, at 33. The Popular Registry Act requires all Israelis to
register with the state. Among the information required to be included is the registrants
ethnicity and religion. Note, supra note 13, at 133 n.2.
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However, Israeli law does not define who is a Jew. 19:1 The Orthodox seek
the enactment of the Halakhic definition of a Jew, which would mean
that the children of Reform and Conservative marriages outside Israel
could be considered illegitimate.193 The Knesset, however, has rejected
this definition because it would discourage immigration and reduce the
support Israel receives from non-Israeli Jews.194 Determining who is a
Jew became crucial with the immigration of Jews who were unconnected
with western Jewry.1 95
Of particular interest is the case of the Bene Israel. 196 Because the
Bene Israel had not followed or known the Halakhic rules for marriage
and divorce, their status as Jews was continually questioned by the
Supreme Rabbinic Council from 1945 to 1962.197 In February 1962 the
Chief Rabbinate issued a definitive directive ordering rabbis to examine
the status of all the Bene Israels. 198 In response to the public clamor over
the Supreme Rabbinic Council's assumption of the power to question the
status of any Jew, the Knesset instructed the Council to consider public
opinion when applying Halakha in the future and declared the Bene
Israel to be Jews. 19 9 After the Knesset resolution, the Supreme
Rabbinical Council never openly questioned the status of a member of
the Bene Israel community, but neither did the Rabbinate ever rescind its
192. Note, supra note 13, at 139.
193. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 274-75.
194. Id. at 275, 303-09.
195. Id. at 275-80. This remains an important political issue. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
20, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
196. The Bene Israel (Children of Israel) were Jews, or at least descendants of Jews, who
lived in India. The community kept few of the traditional laws but kept itself partially sepa-
rated from their aboriginal neighbors. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 275-76.
197. Id. at 276-77.
198. Id. The directive read:
When a request is made to register a marriage between a member of the Bene Israel
community and a person not belonging to that community, it i. incumbent upon the
registering rabbi
a) to search and investigate whether the mother and grandmother of a Bene
Israel applicant, and as far back as possible, was a Jewess or of families which
had married with non-Jews or proselytes, and
b) to ascertain if the parents of the applicant, and their parents, as far back as
possible, had married after divorced, or any among them had married kin
forbidden by Jewish law.
c) Should the registrar rabbi find that none of the above doubts exists, he will
then marry the applicants. Should such doubt arise, the registrar rabbi will
direct the applicants to the district rabbinical court, which will consider the
question and decide whether the marriage is permissible or not, and, if per-
missible, whether there is a need for conversion or immersion.
199. See id. at 278-79. This was the first time the Council was ordered to consider the
public good in its application of Halakha. Id.
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prior decrees on the Bene Israel.2 o Along with the Bene Israel's protest
of the Council's rulings, most non-Orthodox Jews also protested the
Court's deciding who was a Jew.201
Despite the resolution of the Bene Israel problem, the issue of who is
a Jew still remains open. Whether a secular or Orthodox definition is
used is determined on an ad hoc basis.2" 2 One of the most famous cases
addressing the issue is the case of Brother Daniel. Brother Daniel was
born a Jew, but as a young man he converted to Catholicism and joined
a monastic order. Later, he immigrated to Israel and declared his desire
to become a citizen under the Law of Return.20 3 Under Halakha there is
no doubt that Brother Daniel would be a Jew, since he had a Jewish
mother.2" However, the Supreme Judicial Council chose to employ a
secular definition of a Jew, ruling that a Jew ceases to be a Jew when he
embraces a different religion.20 5 While the Orthodox were pleased that
converts from Judaism were excluded from Israel and could not easily
obtain citizenship, they were disturbed by the use of a secular definition
of a Jew.2 ° 6
The reasoning of the Brother Daniel case that the secular laws must
be given secular interpretatios 20 7 was used with less success in Shalit v.
Minister of the Interior.208 At issue in Shalit was the nationality registra-
tion of the children of a Jewish father and a gentile mother2°9 under the
Population Registry Act.210 Halakha makes no distinction between Jew-
ish religion and nationality2 ' and under religious law the children would
not be Jews.212 In Shalit, however, despite the official's refusal to do so,
200. Id. at 279-80.
201. See id.
202. See S. ABRAMov, supra note 1, at 280-318; Englard, supra note 11, at 193-96; Note,
supra note 13, at 139.
203. S. ABRAmov, supra note 1, at 285-90. The Law of Return permits a "Jew" to become
a citizen of Israel by returning to Israel and declaring that he wishes to become a citizen.
Note, supra note 13, at 141.
204. See S. AB, AMov, supra note 1, at 271. Having a Jewish mother is the only require-
ment to be considered Jewish under Jewish law. H. DONIN, supra note 162, at 8.
205. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 288.
206. Id. at 290.
207. Id. at 287-88.
208. See Note, supra note 13, at 142.
209. Id. at 133-34.
210. Id. at 133-34, 133 n.2; see supra note 191.
211. Note, supra note 13, at 135-36.
212. Id. at 136; see Ezra 10:1-4; Kiddushin, 4 THE BABYLONIAN TALtUD; SEDER NASSIM
68b (I. Epstein trans. 1936). The provision for intermarriage should not be confused with an
endorsement of intermarriage. Note, supra note 13, at 136; see Deuteronomy 7:3 (The Jewish
Publication Society of America).
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the parents wanted to register their children's ethnicity as Jewish.213 In
an attempt to avoid the controversy, the Supreme Court delayed making
a decision in the case and asked the Knesset to remove the ethnicity cate-
gory from the Registration Act. The Knesset disregarded the Court's
request.214 After two years of delay, the Supreme Court held that any-
one who declared in good faith he or she was Jewislh must be registered
as a Jew.215
The strong, negative Orthodox reaction threatened the coalition
government. Thus, the government declared that the Halakhic definition
of a Jew was to be used when determining nationality and religion for the
purpose of registry.216 What is most interesting about the Shalit case is
that both the Knesset and the Supreme Court tried to avoid making a
decision.217 When the Supreme Court was forced to make a final deci-
sion, it was divided five to four. Furthermore, it took eight opinions and
130 pages to explain the Court's reasoning.21I The Knesset then reversed
the Court's decision by a compromise which defined a Jew according to
religious law but granted Jewish status to a broad group of people.21 9
B. Laws of Personal Status
The religious courts exemplify the most prominent use of religious
law in Israel. These courts are given authority over personal status. Fur-
thermore, there are separate courts for different religions. 220 With re-
gards to the Halakha courts, the Orthodox have been able to maintain
control.22'
There is much support for civil marriage and divorce among many
of the non-religious who resent being restricted by t religious court sys-
tem which does not reflect their beliefs or modem :notions of justice.222
213. Note, supra note 13, at 134.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 140.
216. Id. at 140-41.
217. Id. at 147-48.
218. Id. at 14247.
219. Englard, supra note 11, at 195 n.24.
220. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 175-76. This is an extension of similar policies under
the Ottoman Empire and British Mandate Palestine. Id. at 175-76, 199; see Falk, 71venty-five
Years of Family Law According to Jewish Religious Law, 5 DINE ISRAEL vii (1974). Further, it
is not in conflict with Jewish tradition to sanction the use of other religious legal systems,
because in Judaism only Jews have been ordered to follow Jewish law, See Note, supra note
13, at 137; see H. DONIN, supra note 162, at 11-12.
221. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 180.
222. See eg., S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 192-98; I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 193-95;
Englard, supra note 11, at 202.
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Also a cause for displeasure among secularists is Jewish divorce law.m23
Under traditional Halakha, a divorce was availible whenever a husband
demanded.224 Under Israeli law divorces are freely given if both parties
consent.22 However if the court consents, a man may remarry even if
his wife does not agree to a divorce, but a woman may not remarry with-
out a divorce. 2 6 The religious courts have attempted to mitigate this
hardship by forcing husbands to consent to divorces. However, sending
stubborn husbands to prison is not always successful.2 7 Husbands al-
ready in prison are not susceptible to this coercion?28 Additionally, hus-
bands who are insane are incapable of giving their consent to a divorce,
and so the wives of the insane cannot remarry.229 Furthermore, since
Jewish law does not provide for the presumption of death of lost people,
women can find themselves permanently married to a phantom
husband.230
One of the major areas of inequity is the treatment of the mamzer
(bastard).231 According to traditional Jewish law, a mamzer cannot
marry other Jews. This remains the law of the State of Israel.?
The institution of secular marriages and divorces would divide the
coalition government and the Israeli nation. The Orthodox would con-
sider the children of some civil marriages illegitimate and, therefore,
223. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 186-88.
224. Lahav, The Status of Women in Israel-Myth and Reality, 22 AM. J. CoMP. L 107, 119
(1974).
225. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 186-87. In addition, a man may be forced to grant a
divorce under certain circumstances. Kiddushin, supra note 212, at 50a.
226. S. A.BAMov, supra note 1, at 186-87. Polygamy is not traditionally forbidden to
males under Jewish Law. Id. Baba Mezia, 1 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD; SEDER NEZIKt
l15a (I. Epstein trans. 1935) (interpreting Deuteronomy 17:17).
227. S. ABRAMov, supra note 1, at 187-88.
228. Id. at 188.
229. Lahav, supra note 224, at 121-22 (1974).
230. Id.
231. See S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 189-90; I. ENGLARD, supra note 1, at 189-90.
Mamzer is usually translated as bastard or illegitimate, but it does not actually refer to a child
born out ofwedlock. Rather, a mamzer is somebody born of a religiously prohibited marriage.
Kiddushin, supra note 212, at 64a. See generally H. DONIN, supra note 162, at 290. The
closest to the European conception of bastard in Jewish Law appears to be Sethuki. This is
translated as one who knows his or her mother is but does not know who his or her father is.
Kiddushin, supra note 212, at 69b-70a.
232. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 189-90; Englard, supra note 11, at 203; Shava, The
Property Rights of Spouses Cohabitating Without Marriage in Israel-A Comparative Commen-
tary, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 465, 471 n.31 (1983); "No one misbegotten [Hebrew
mamzer] shall be admitted into the congregation of the Lord.. . ." Deuteronomy 23:3; see
Kiddushin, supra note 212, at 69b "Priests, Levites, and Israelites may intermarry with each
other.".
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would not allow intermarriages.233 As a result, Jews might quickly be
divided into two groups: those with "clean" pedigrees and those who
cannot prove that there are no "tainted" marriages in their past.
Gender inequality of the personal status laws has also caused dis-
content.234 The personal status laws were excluded from the Women's
Equal Rights Law to placate the Orthodox.235 Not only have inequities
continued in the substantive law applied by the Rabbinic courts, but wo-
men are also not allowed to sit as judges or be witnesses in the religious
courts.2 3 6
The Israeli Government shows additional deference to Islamic per-
sonal status laws. Special deference has often been shown to Islamic law
in Israeli-Islamic courts because the Arab minority particularly resents
the intrusions of the state's law.2 37 This has been especially true in the
deference shown to Islamic law's sex bias. 2
38
C. Effect of Halakha on Israeli Commerce
Controversy has also developed over the economic costs of enforc-
239Tideing Halakha in business areas. Israel does not allow its ships, passen-
gers or cargo, to leave port on the Sabbath. Furthermore, passenger
boats may serve only kosher food.24° This policy results in both in-
creased costs and the loss of passengers. Complications have also been
caused by the state's requirement that special permission be granted to
operate factories on the Sabbath. This requirement has reduced the com-
petitiveness of factories which cannot gain such permission.241
D. Conclusion and Manifestations of the Divisions In Israel
Religious law is a divisive element in Israel. The issue of who is a
Jew threatens to divide the community into those the Orthodox accept as
Jewish and those they do not. Some argue that a dual system of civil and
religious marriages would resolve problems but would further divide the
233. Englard, supra note 11, at 202-03.
234. Lahav, supra note 224.
235. Id. This law mandated equality in many areas of the law, thus giving women the right
to control their own property and an equal right to custody. Section 5, however, speciflcally
excluded the marriage and divorce laws. See Lahav, supra note 224.
236. Lahav, supra note 224, at 120.
237. See R. EISENMAN, supra note 16, at 328-469.
238. See id.
239. S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 217-23.
240. Id. at 199, 218.
241. Id. at 198-99.
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community.242 Likewise, the use of religious law for personal status
merely serves to further alienate women, mamzer, and secularists. 43 In-
creasingly, secularists are annoyed by the symbols of state establishment
of religion.244 The status quo no longer seems to be an adequate compro-
mise. In frustration, the secularists have even defiled synagogues with
swastikas and destroyed religious articles.245 It appears that the Knesset
must both recognize freedom from religion and Reform Judaism to
regain harmony. The secularists represent a plurality of the nation24
and increasingly are refusing to accept the restriction of their civil rights
caused by the endorsement of Orthodox Judaism.2 '7 If religious law is
abandoned, the nation can still be unified by emphasizing secular
nationalism.
VI. CONCLUSION
Religious law can be both a unifying and a dividing factor in a na-
tion. Islam, and in particular the orthodox Hanbali school, is the reli-
gion of virtually all Saudis. 24 The use of Islamic Shari'a is not merely
accepted but demanded. Overwhelmingly, the people accept the law,
anachronisms and all, as just.249 Additionally, the Saudi Government
can afford the extra cost of recruiting foreign workers and investors re-
sulting from the use of Shari'a. The Saudis do not judge the law from a
modern, western perspective and are willing to pay the price of using this
ancient law.
Israel's experience with using religious law as the secular law has
been less then ideal. Many Israelis do not accept the sexism of Jewish
law nor do they accept the limits Jewish law places on their life. Further,
the use of Jewish law has limited Israel's ability to compete economi-
cally, a cost the Israeli economy cannot afford. Even Israel's limited use
of religious law has resulted in unacceptable costs and conflict.
Ironically Saudi Arabia has been able to implement its hard-line po-
sition on the use of religious law by applying Shari'a strictly. The rigid
interpretation of religious law permits the king to enact modern laws at
242. See Englard, supra note 11, at 195-96, 203.
243. See supra notes 220-30 and accompanying text.
244. See Englard, supra note 11, at 202-08.
245. See Bus Stop War, supra note 14; Israeli Leaders Act, supra note 14; Swastikas Deface
Synagogue, supra note 15.
246. See S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 380-402.
247. See Bus Stop War, supra note 14; Israeli Leaders Act, supra note 14; Swastikas Deface
Synagogue, supra note 15.
248. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
249. Comment, supra note 5, at 444, 480-81.
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his discretion. In addition, the Saudis immense wealth permits the King-
dom to establish the conditions under which it will do business, thus
protecting the Saudi's way of life and the purity of Shari'a. Further, the
Saudi people accept the use of Shari'a thus limiting the intrusion on the
rights of the few people who do not accept the application of Hanbali
Islam to every aspect of their lives.
In both countries, however, the use of religious law can be consid-
ered an unwarranted intrusion on religious freedom. Although most
Saudi Arabians seem to accept the use of Shari'a, those who do object
have their rights severely compromised because of the severity of Saudi
law. This is similar to the situation encountered by the secularists in
Israel. Both Israel and Saudi Arabia, therefore, violate the rights of their
citizens by forcing them to conform to religious standards which they
may not necessarily believe. Further, both countries do incur economic
costs by using religious law.
Israel's experience with religious law is very different. Issues of reli-
gion in Israel have repeatedly caused severe conflict, 250 causing religious
parties to threaten to withdraw and even withdraw from the coalition
government on many occasions.251 Some citizens axe alienated from the
state because under religious law they cannot marry whom they choose,
cannot obtain a divorce, and cannot obtain a declaration that their miss-
ing husband is dead. 252 Furthermore, both the Ultra-Orthodox and the
Secularists have resorted to the destruction of property to defend their
positions.253 The current situation should not continue. In order to se-
cure domestic peace in Israel, the Knesset eventually must confront the
issue of the relationship between religion and state in Israel. One possi-
ble resolution is to delegate Halakha to a common law to be used to fill
lacunae in the law of the Knesset and as a guide in making laws. A more
involved role for the Halakha would only serve to alienate the atheists,
and the Reform and Conservative Jews of Israel. Furthermore, it would
widen the split that has already developed among the people of Israel.
250. See notes 179-238 and accompanying text.
251. See S. ABRAMOV, supra note 1, at 147-374.
252. See supra notes 222-30 and accompanying text.
253. See Bus Stop War, supra note 14; Israeli Leaders Act, supra note 14; Swastikas Deface
Synagogue, supra note 15.
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